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ANCHORAGE: GAMING CAPITAL
OF THE PACIFIC RIM
This Note examines the current state of legalized gambling in
Alaska and inquires as to the optimal breadth of legalized gambling
for the state to pursue.  The Note surveys the various forms of gam-
bling currently present in the United States, including Internet gam-
bling, and explores how legalization of the respective forms may im-
pact Alaska.  The Note’s final evaluations are critical of most forms
of gambling, including those forms currently legal in Alaska and
those otherwise widely accepted by American states, but the Note
also suggests that the development of destination gaming resorts, if
strategically located and targeted to a receptive tourist consumer
market, may serve as a considerable source of revenue and jobs for
the people of Alaska.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Legalized gambling1 is an established aspect of Alaska culture.
Whether you find yourself in an Anchorage mall, driving the
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streets of Soldotna, or spending any time within any sizable Alaska
town, you are bound to encounter come-ons for an opportunity to
achieve riches through the simple skill of selecting the winning
pull-tab.2  Despite the ubiquitous presence of legalized gambling in
Alaska (in the form of pull-tabs and charity bingo), the severe re-
strictions on the scope of legalized gambling are such that one
could plausibly ask: does Alaska really permit gambling?  After all,
there are no casinos, no state lottery, and none of the typical forms
of gambling attractive to the typical American gambler.  Why is
this?3  Is the current scope of legalized gambling in Alaska at the
1. The terms “gambling” and “gaming” are, for practical purposes, synony-
mous.  “Gaming” is a euphemism for gambling, developed by Las Vegas casino
marketers in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s to counter potential stigma attached
to the term “gambling” and to promote Las Vegas as a family vacation destina-
tion, in response to the competitive threat posed by the recently opened (1978)
casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey.  To allay possible reader confusion, I will
consistently use the term “gambling,” except when strategic purposes otherwise
dictate.  See generally BARNEY VINSON, LAS VEGAS BEHIND THE TABLES! 17, 215-
17 (1988); PETE EARLEY, SUPER CASINO: INSIDE THE “NEW” LAS VEGAS passim
(2000) (providing an up-to-date perspective on the gambling industry in Las Ve-
gas).
2. Pull-tabs, although not necessarily unique to Alaska, are nonetheless not a
particularly common form of gambling.  For those readers outside of Alaska per-
haps unfamiliar with pull-tabs, they are best described as “instant lottery” tickets.
Pull-tab games are much more limited in scale than the conventional instant lot-
tery games found in places such as California.  Prizes are never very large (seldom
more than $500), and pull-tab games, unlike their lottery brethren, are not state-
wide affairs.  Rather, each “game” and all tickets comprising that particular
“game” are held at the same pull-tab parlor (usually in a fishbowl).  Anyone will-
ing to buy all of the pull-tab tickets for a game at a particular parlor will thus also
buy all of the winning tickets for that game.  While not a recommended strategy
for the profit-minded, the parlor proprietor may extend a heartfelt measure of
gratitude for the investment effort.
3. One may argue that the people had spoken.  Alaskans voted on a ballot
measure on August 28, 1990, that would have granted municipalities the option to
introduce a wide assortment of gambling forms, including casino games, slot ma-
chines, and pari-mutuel events (horse and dog racing).  The initiative lost by a
margin of nearly 2:1, but that was ten years ago.  The national perception of gam-
bling has changed in the interim, and Alaska is now more sensitive to the need to
branch out beyond its economic dependence upon the oil industry.  Although the
initiative was attacked in 1990 by Tony Knowles (then former Anchorage mayor
running for governor) and would likely face similar opposition by Gov. Tony
Knowles today in 2000, voter awareness of gambling and the impact of gambling
has become much more sophisticated (as the ubiquitous presence of pull-tab par-
lors may or may not make manifest) and campaigns for a similar measure today
would likely receive stronger financial backing than ten years ago (the initiative
attracted only limited, albeit vocal, campaigning in 1990).  It may be about time
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optimum for political, economic, and social purposes in this par-
ticular state?  Should Alaska consider an expansion in the legaliza-
tion of gambling?  What are the risks and benefits attendant in
doing so?
The extent of legalized gambling in America is determined on
a state-by-state basis, and in the current climate, the voters of the
fifty states are consistent and supportive in their acceptance of le-
galized gambling.  As of today, gambling is legal in forty-eight
states (the holdouts being Utah and Hawai’i),4 and thirty-seven
states (along with the District of Columbia) feature state-
sponsored lotteries.5  Alaska’s closest neighboring states—Wash-
ington, Oregon, California, and Idaho—all permit legalized gam-
bling on Native American tribal lands.6  Canada also allows gam-
bling essentially Canada-wide (gambling is federally regulated in
Canada7), and this comes into play particularly in the nearby West-
ern Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Alberta.8
Alaska, in contrast to the majority of states, does not run a
state lottery.9  Alaska does not currently allow gambling on Native
lands.  Instead, the currently available forms of gambling in Alaska
include the aforementioned pull-tabs and charity bingo, which pro-
vide about $260 million in annual gross revenue, but little in the
way of new jobs.10  However, these forms of gambling bring with
them the negative social consequences of gambling.11  There was a
for another vote.  See generally Richard Mauer, Voters Snub Casino Plan, Rail
Measure, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 29, 1990, at B1.
4. See NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION, NATIONAL
GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY FINAL REPORT 1-1 n.2 (1999) [hereinafter NGISC
FINAL REPORT].
5. See Charles T. Clotfelter et al., State Lotteries at the Turn of the Century:
Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission 1 (Apr. 23, 1999),
available at <http://www.ngisc.gov>.
6. See Gary C. Anders, Indian Gaming: Financial and Regulatory Issues, in
GAMBLING: SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS AND PUBLIC POLICY, 556 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 100 (Mar. 1998) [hereinafter GAMBLING].
7. See Colin S. Campbell & Garry J. Smith, Canadian Gambling: Trends and
Public Policy Issues, in GAMBLING, supra note 6, at 22-23.
8. See id. at 29.
9. See David Whitney, Gambling Report Due; Loescher Sees Upside,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 17, 1999, at B1.
10. See Jon Little, Homer Couple Accused in Pull-Tab Thefts, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 11, 1998, at D1.
11. See, e.g., Mary Pemberton, Ex-Official on Slope Accused of Profiting from
Charity Scam, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 25, 2000, at A1; Last Chance Pull-
Tab Business Has Run Out of Chances, State Says, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 11, 2000, at B1.
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recent push to determine whether to allow convenience gambling
(e.g., video poker terminals) in Alaska establishments,12 but beyond
that, curiously little has been done recently to address the issue of
legalized gambling in Alaska and to consider to what degree the
state of Alaska should attempt to capture the benefits of legalized
gambling, as well as to examine what costs legalized gambling
(even at the current levels) brings upon Alaskans.
This Note will examine the various types of gambling present
in the United States, and how the propagation of these forms of
gambling in Alaska may impact the state.  The Note will also dis-
cuss the highly topical issue of Native gaming, and how the expan-
sion of gambling on Native lands in the contiguous United States
may or may not present some opportunities and precedents for
Alaska to follow.  The Note will conclude by opposing most forms
of legalized gambling (including the varieties currently allowed and
recently considered in Alaska), criticizing these forms as bringing
the costs of gambling to Alaskans without bringing much in the
way of benefits.  This will be contrasted with perhaps counter-
intuitive insights regarding Anchorage, and how Anchorage may
prove a near-optimal choice as a locale for destination gaming re-
sorts.
II.  NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY
In 1996, Congress approved the National Gambling Impact
Study Act, which created the impetus for the nine-person National
Gambling Impact Study Commission (“NGISC”) to assess the cur-
rent state of gambling in America and to present suggestions for
determining the course of legal gambling in the near future.13  The
Committee, selected by President Clinton, featured Robert
Loescher, director of Sealaska Corporation, thereby managing to
include one representative of Alaska as well as one (but only one)
12. See H.B. 182, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2000) (not passed out of commit-
tee, Mar. 6, 2000; no carryover, May 3, 2000); see also Dan Joling, Video Gambling
Bill to Remain in Committee, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 8, 2000, at B3 (dis-
cussing status and stasis of House Bill 182, designed to allow charitable conven-
ience gambling); Dan Joling, Gambling Bill Messages Swamp Lawmakers,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 11, 2000, at B4 (describing efforts of bar, hotel,
and restaurant lobby using public opinion messages to support convenience gam-
bling).
13. See National Gambling Impact Study Comm’n Final Report: Hearing on
the Final Report of the Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n Before the Senate
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 115 (1999) (executive summary submitted
for the record).
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representative of Native American interests on the panel.14  After
conducting extensive discourse on the issue with Americans di-
rectly impacted by gambling, and sponsoring outside research, the
NGISC presented its findings in a final report in June of 1999.
The NGISC final report offered a number of suggestions.  For
instance, gambling on the Internet should be developed under fed-
eral rather than state law, particularly as it would require federal
resources and the federal government’s “singularity of voice” to
implement the NGISC’s recommendation: a prospective ban on
any Internet gambling not already authorized.15  The report also
recommended that the expansion of legal gambling in the United
States should be halted for the present time.  Although character-
ized in the press as a negative evaluation of gambling, the NGISC
findings were actually fairly sympathetic toward at least some as-
pects of legal gambling, but the glaring absence of substantial, sci-
entific research into the long-term economic and social impact of
legalized gambling fomented a desire for caution among NGISC
members, quite reasonable especially given the wildfire spread of
legal gambling nationwide within the last decade.  In no way did
the NGISC final report advise prohibitions or future restrictions on
currently legal forms of gambling (aside from betting on collegiate
athletics, and Internet gambling, which currently has unclear legal
status).
III.  INTERNET GAMBLING
Few forms of new technology have had as pervasive and as in-
stantaneous an impact on the lives of Alaskans, and in fact all
Americans, as has the development of the Internet.  The way we
communicate with one another, the manner and speed in which we
obtain information, the way we buy and sell things, and even the
language that we use in conversation have all changed dramatically
as a direct effect of the Internet.16  The Internet also impacts the
way people entertain themselves, including those with a passion for
gambling.  A quick browse on the World Wide Web will readily re-
veal numerous sites whereby individuals may wager real money on
real bets (and perhaps even hope for real winnings).  The number
of gambling websites and the amount wagered on these websites
14. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at Statement of Commissioner
Robert W. Loescher.
15. See id. at 5-12.
16. See generally Joshua Quittner, An Eye on the Future: Jeff Bezos Merely
Wants to Be Earth’s Biggest Seller of Everything, TIME, Dec. 27, 1999, at 56 (biog-
raphy of Amazon.com founder and Time’s 1999 Person of the Year).
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have ballooned within the last couple of years, and will likely con-
tinue to expand rapidly for the near future.17
But are they legal?  According to some federal government
sources, gambling websites on the Internet have always been pro-
hibited.18  Unfortunately, the law is unclear.  The legal status of
gambling is generally determined individually by the states, and a
small number of states have passed legislation expressly addressing
the legality of on-line gambling.19  Most of these states, including
Nevada, Louisiana, Texas, and Illinois, are states featuring large-
scale legalized gambling revenue that is placed at risk by allowing
new forms of gambling to emerge from the Internet, and these
states have recently banned (or introduced legislation banning)
Internet gambling explicitly.20  Although the State of Alaska has
not specifically addressed the issue, Internet gambling may be
deemed illegal in Alaska.21  But how does one enforce these state
17. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-1.
18. See Matthew E. Yarbrough, Internet Gambling: The Risks and Rewards,
547 P.L.I./PAT. 1213, 1218 (1999).
19. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-7.
20. See id.
21.  Alaska Statutes section 11.66.200 reads:
(a) A person commits the offense of gambling if the person engages in
unlawful gambling.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that
the defendant was a player in a social game.
(c) Gambling is a violation for the first offense.  Gambling is a class B
misdemeanor for the second and each subsequent offense.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.66.200 (LEXIS 1998) (emphasis added).  “Unlawful” gam-
bling means any gambling “not specifically authorized by law.”  Id. § 11.66.280(11).
The blanket language appears comprehensive enough to cover all gambling, in-
cluding new forms such as Internet gambling.  However, may players gambling at
home using their computers make use of the “player in a social game” affirmative
defense?  By statute, a “social game” is defined as “gambling in a home where no
house player, house bank, or house odds exist and where there is no house income
from the operation of the game.”  Id. § 11.66.280(9).  Enforcement against indi-
vidual computer users will be challenging enough in any circumstance, but when
dealing with cyberspace gambling, identifying such traditionally tangible elements
as the “house player” and “house bank” and specifying the “house income” intro-
duces a heightened challenge unseen in conventional gambling enforcement.  For
more enterprising Alaskans wishing to create an Internet gambling website rather
than simply play as end-users, Alaska Statutes section 05.15.180 may also pertain,
as it reads, in part:
(a) This chapter does not authorize the use of playing cards, dice, rou-
lette wheels, coin-operated instruments or machines, or other ob-
jects or instruments used, designed, or intended primarily for gam-
ing or gambling or any other method or implement not expressly
authorized by the department [of revenue].
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laws on the World Wide Web, particularly when dealing with web-
sites based out-of-state, or even outside American borders?22  To
facilitate enforcement efforts, the legality of Internet gambling may
be best handled on the federal level.23
Thus turning to the federal level, the Wire Communications
Act of 1961 (“Wire Act”)24 is a relevant source of law pertaining to
on-line gambling.25  Passed well before the advent of the Internet,
the Wire Act strictly prohibits interstate use of phone lines for the
purpose of gambling.26  The Act was intended primarily to impede
the practice of bookies lining up bets on horse races, collegiate
football games, and other athletic events.27  Unfortunately, the
statutory language is grounded in the technologies of the time, and
the application of the Wire Act to Internet gambling is fraught with
ambiguity.  Internet wagering, taking place in the ethereal jurisdic-
(b) With the exception of raffles, lotteries, bingo games, pull-tab games,
race classics, rain classics, goose classics . . . and king salmon classics,
an activity may not be licensed under this chapter unless it existed in
the state in substantially the same form and was conducted in sub-
stantially the same manner before January 1, 1959.
Id. § 05.15.180; see also id. §§ 11.66.200-280 (explicating criminal gambling of-
fenses, particularly against gambling enterprise promoters and profiteers).
22. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-7 to 5-9.
23. See id. at 5-9.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).  The statute reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wa-
gering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets
or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the trans-
mission of a wire communication which entitles the recipi-
ent to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers,
or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of informa-
tion for use in news reporting of sporting events or con-
tests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest
from a State or foreign country where betting on that
sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign
country in which such betting is legal.
(c) Nothing contained in this section shall create immunity from
criminal prosecution under any laws of any State.
Id.
25. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-6.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-967, at 1 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2631, 2631.
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tion of cyberspace, arguably may not involve a “wire communica-
tion” for the conveyance of bets.28
The Wire Act specifically prohibits wagering on “sporting
event[s] or contest[s].”29  Most Internet gambling sites, perhaps
specifically to avoid targeting by federal laws, concentrate on tradi-
tional casino games (e.g., blackjack, roulette), and arguably fall
outside of the ken of “sporting events or contests” and are thereby
not illegal.  According to the Department of Justice and the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigations, the Wire Act nevertheless prohibits
Internet gambling;30 however, the Wire Act is limited in its applica-
tion to punishing gambling for business purposes.  That is, the
“house” may be punished for running illegal Internet gambling es-
tablishments, but individual bettors are not targeted for prosecu-
tion.31  Indeed, a few Americans have been investigated recently for
Internet-related gambling; however, most gambling websites are
“physically located” offshore, outside the jurisdiction of federal en-
forcement officials.32  Further compounding the problem, Internet
casinos can easily change the physical location of their host servers
(computers) and Internet IP addresses (numerical addresses read
by the ISP) of their casinos, keeping operations one step ahead of
law enforcement, even while maintaining a continuously active
website under an unchanging domain name (e.g., www.bigmoney.
com).33
In 1997, the United States Senate and House created legisla-
tion intended to amend the Wire Act to clear up ambiguities and
sharpen the Wire Act’s applicability to Internet bettors.34  The Sen-
ate-introduced bill passed ninety to ten, but neither it nor a similar
measure introduced in the House were ever signed into law, and
the effort was eventually relinquished.35  In 1999, Senator Jon Kyl
of Arizona spearheaded a new effort, introducing the Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act (“IGPA”), a slightly revamped version
of the 1997 bill.36  Following minor amendments, Senator Kyl’s bill
passed in the Senate on the third attempt in November 1999.37
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See Yarbrough, supra note 18, at 1216-25, 1232.
31. See id. at 1223.
32. See id. at 1226-34.
33. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-11.
34. See id. at 5-10.
35. See Anthony Cabot, Internet Gambling in the Information Age, NEV.
LAW., Mar. 1999, at 20-21.
36. See Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999).
37. See 145 CONG. REC. S14863-02, S14870 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999).
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Kyl’s bill failed to pass in the House,38 however, owing to a number
of factors, including objections that the measures were too narrow.
The bill specifically prohibited “a person engaged in a gambling
business knowingly to use the Internet or any other interactive
computer service . . . to place, receive, or otherwise make a bet or
wager.”39  Although apparently intended to apply to bettors as well
as gambling establishments, it is doubtful that most Internet users
who gamble, even heavily, could be described as “engaged in a
gambling business”40 rather than pursuing a casual pastime on their
computers. Although the proposed statute could have covered
bookmaking agents and “professional gamblers,” placing bets on
the Internet often renders the need for a “bookie” middleman ob-
solete.  Furthermore, considering the specious tax benefits to be
gleaned from filing and claiming tax status as a professional gam-
bler, it may be difficult to produce sufficient evidence that even the
most successful gamblers do it as a professional business and can be
identified as such.  Meanwhile, Internet users will still be able to
place their bets through the predominantly offshore gambling web-
sites that, although “engaged in gambling business,” present a seri-
ous challenge to law enforcement efforts in establishing jurisdic-
tion.
In other respects Senator Kyl’s bill was clearly too broad.  The
bill made it illegal “to send, receive, or invite information assisting
in the placing of a bet or wager.”41 It is difficult to pinpoint how
broad this “information assisting in the placing of a bet”42 language
may have been interpreted and thus what was and what was not
covered.  Most casinos are amazingly coy in their depiction of
gambling in advertisements, whether in print, television spots, bill-
boards, or on the Internet, and would seem to have fallen outside
of the bill’s scope.  Nonetheless, was the simple fact that a Las Ve-
gas hotel and casino featured gambling on the premises, and had a
website designed to entice prospective visitors—even without ex-
plicit mention of the existence of “gaming” opportunities—enough
of a nexus to have supported charges of violation of the proposed
law?  Did the posting of point spreads present sufficient betting in-
formation to bring charges?  Because such enterprises as personal
websites of dedicated fans and websites adjunct to sports channels
38. See, e.g., Andrew Beyer, On Internet Bill, All Bets Are Off, WASH. POST,
July 26, 2000, at D1 (discussing failure of Internet Gambling Prohibition Act to
pass in the House).
39. S.692 § 2(b)(1).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 2(b)(1)(B).
42. Id.
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(e.g., ESPN, CNN/SI) may have fallen within the penumbra of this
bill’s scrutiny, the bill’s language may have been publicly perceived
as being too expansive.
The effort to ban Internet gambling has not ceased.  The
Comprehensive Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 200043 has
been introduced into the House, featuring language remarkably
similar to that of the predecessor Kyl bill.  Note that even should
the current effort or future anti-Internet gambling bills ever be
signed into law, they may yet encounter constitutional challenges.
In the 1997 case, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,44 the Su-
preme Court found that the provisions of the Communications De-
cency Act, banning indecent (and obscene) materials from the
Internet, were unconstitutionally broad.45  The Court determined
that the restrictions on “indecent” materials are content-based im-
positions on free speech and thereby infringe First Amendment
rights,46 even in the form of “commercial speech,” which tradition-
ally receives less protection than other more privileged forms of
speech.47  One may forcefully argue that Internet advertising by
gambling enterprises, particularly advertising that does not offer
explicit wagers, should receive protection at least equal to that
granted individuals posting pornography on the Internet.  An in-
teresting irony of this situation is that anti-Internet gambling bills
establish conditions under which the groups with perhaps the
greatest desire to see Internet gambling operations banned—that
is, the “live” casinos of Nevada and elsewhere—are simultaneously
the “easiest targets” for enforcement of the ban, should the ban be
broadly interpreted.  As a result, the casinos may present one of
the strongest contingents wishing to see the Kyl-inspired bills killed
in Congress.48
43. H.R. 5020, 106th Cong. (2000).
44. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
45. See id. at 849.
46. See id. at 874.
47. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
48. The Las Vegas casinos have had notable influence in Washington politics
and until now have generally supported legislation that would impede the expan-
sion of legalized gambling (in order to stifle potential competitors).  Now, how-
ever, the casinos appear to be doing an about-face.  Perhaps, in addition to seeing
the dangerous double-edged sword that such Kyl-type gambling prohibition legis-
lation may present to casino interests, the casinos have come upon an even more
pragmatic reason to oppose such legislation: the casinos may be seeking to branch
out into the business of Internet gambling, too.  See Marci McDonald, Betting the
House, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 2000, at 15 (reporting interest in
Internet gambling investment opportunities by chiefs of large Las Vegas casinos);
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IV.  GAMBLING ON NATIVE AMERICAN LANDS
The emergence of legal gambling on Native lands and the re-
sulting benefits (in revenue and provision of jobs) to Native
Americans are the most salient developments—and perhaps the
best news to be heard—over the last decade in American legalized
gambling.  Many Native communities have lifted themselves out of
moribund economic conditions with the establishment of tribal ca-
sinos.49  Foxwoods, a casino owned by the Mashantucket Pequot
tribe in Connecticut, is not only one of the largest casinos in the
world,50 it is also the most profitable51 (and for accoutrements, lav-
ishness, and “quality of stay” purposes,  may be perceived as being
on par with any of the Vegas casinos).  The State of Connecticut
sanctioned the efforts of the nearby Mohegan tribe to construct a
rival casino, the Mohegan Sun, which has found similar success in
recent years.  Of course, Foxwoods and the Pequots capitalized on
the rare fortune of being essentially the lone gambling opportunity
in the densely-populated New England region, a circumstance
other tribes will be unable to match in today’s nearly-saturated
market.  Nevertheless, many tribes have found the development
and operations of gambling ventures to be worthwhile endeavors,
particularly when faced with little else in the way of opportunity.52
Native tribes in the contiguous United States are able to capi-
talize on unique federal-state-tribal sovereignty relationships to
allow for the establishment of casinos, even in states which allow
for some forms of gambling but do not otherwise allow for casinos
(e.g., California and Washington).53  Perhaps unfortunately, Alaska
Natives are unable to exploit this same combination of factors (that
allow tribal casinos), due to their anomalous legal status.  In 1971,
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,54 adopted by Congress,
specified that Alaska Native tribes would no longer continue as
see also Donald L. Bartlett et al., Throwing the Game; Why Congress Isn’t Closing
a Loophole That Fosters Gambling on College Sports—and Corrupts Them, TIME,
Sept. 25, 2000, at 25 (reporting on political influence of gambling interest groups
and impact of legalized sports betting on athletics).
49. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-6.
50. See id. at 6-1.
51. See James H. Frey, Federal Involvement in U.S. Gaming Regulation, in
GAMBLING, supra note 6, at 148.
52. See generally NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-5 to 6-6 (discussing
potential of gambling revenue to alleviate unemployment, poverty, and other so-
cioeconomic problems faced by many Native American communities).
53. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-10.
54. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1629(e) (1994)).
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“tribes” per se, living on sovereign “reservations” (with inalienable
land rights) under the trusteeship of the federal government.55
Rather, Alaska “tribes” would be recharacterized as private corpo-
rations (with constituent Natives receiving shares) to be incorpo-
rated under Alaska state law and subject to Alaska jurisdiction.56
“Reservation” lands would cease as such, and the newly formed
Native corporations would receive conveyance and title (again, un-
der state law) to forty-four million acres of alienable land and an
award of $962.5 million.57  This status as state-governed corpora-
tions on privately owned Alaska land distinguishes Alaska Natives
from Native tribes in the contiguous United States, and it is this
same distinction that may render Alaska Natives unable to garner
new wealth via the gambling industry in the same manner as Na-
tives of the Lower Forty-Eight.
In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,58 the Su-
preme Court held that tribes, as sovereign nations, were allowed to
conduct gambling on “Indian lands” within a state as long as gam-
bling of some form was permitted within that state.59  Although the
limits of this holding were never really examined, it follows that
even if a state were only to allow such minor forms of gambling as
pull-tabs and charity bingo, any tribe in that state could conduct
any form of gambling, including casino table games and slot ma-
chines, as long as operations were conducted on Indian lands under
tribal sovereignty.60
Cabazon created a great deal of ambiguity in defining the lim-
its of state-wide gambling operations.  Perhaps to develop a consis-
tent approach, Congress enacted, in the following year, the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (“IGRA”).61  This Act divides
gambling operations into three classes.62  The first two classes con-
sist of fairly minor and non-lucrative forms of gambling, such as so-
cial games, bingo, and pull-tabs.63  As long as gambling of a par-
ticular class is legal in any form within a state, tribes are able to
55. See id.; see also Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S.
520, 523-24, 532-33 (1998) [hereinafter Venetie II].  The Metlakatla/Annette Is-
land Reserve is excepted from these ANCSA provisions; Natives of this island
reservation in Southeastern Alaska may be considered to possess similar legal
status to that of Natives in the contiguous United States.
56. See Venetie II, 522 U.S. at 524.
57. See id.
58. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
59. See id. at 210-11, 220-21.
60. See id. at 210-14.
61. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
62. See id. § 2703(6)-(8).
63. See id. § 2703(6)-(7).
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conduct games of these sorts completely at their discretion without
the constraints of state or federal oversight.64  The third class (i.e.,
“Class III”) encompasses the most lucrative forms of gambling, in-
cluding table games, slot machines, pari-mutuel horse racing, pri-
vate lotteries, and so forth.65  Under the IGRA, tribes wishing to
develop Class III gambling ventures on Indian lands would have to
work out a compact with the applicable state government to do
so.66  Most states now feature state-sponsored lotteries, and it
would hardly be surprising that the same state government would
be somewhat unwilling to extend gambling rights to rival Native
operations, as that would permit the Native games to cut into the
state’s business.  Florida (which operates various state-sponsored
lottery games) failed to participate in compact negotiations with
the Seminole Tribe for gambling rights.  The Seminole Tribe
sought redress in the courts to force the state of Florida to negoti-
ate in good faith.  In the ensuing case, Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida,67 the Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment
granted Florida sovereign immunity protection as a state, and thus
the state was not subject to suit in federal court by the Seminoles.68
The IGRA provides that in situations where state govern-
ments are unwilling or unable to develop compacts with Native
tribes, the Secretary of the Interior may step in to determine the
proper extent of gambling operations the Native tribes may under-
take.69  However, the IGRA dictates that the Secretary of the Inte-
rior will “negotiate” with the governor of the relevant state to
come to the proper result.70  Certainly, the state tactic of refusing to
negotiate a compact with an enterprising tribe can be readily taken
one step further by refusing to negotiate with the Secretary of the
Interior.  The IGRA is ambiguous as to whether the input of the
state governor is required, or is rather a desirable act of consulta-
tion in the process.71  If the governor’s input is mandated, the De-
partment of the Interior and Native tribes may be at a loss under
the Eleventh Amendment to force a stubborn and taciturn gover-
nor to come to the bargaining table (this, in fact, is the common
64. See id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).
65. See id. § 2703(8).
66. See id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
67. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
68. See id. at 72.
69. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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view among the states and states’ attorneys general).72  If, however,
the governor’s role is simply advisory, perhaps the “negotiations”
may be conducted and concluded without the input of a state gov-
ernor, and the Secretary of the Interior has a free hand in plotting
the proper course for enterprising Native tribes.73  Although the
Seminole result hints that the IGRA may require the participation
and approval of the state governor, the case does not specifically
cover this ground and a strong argument may be advanced that the
Department of the Interior has sole determinative authority.
The notion that the participation of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior is necessary, and that the participation of state executive offi-
cials may be necessary, in determining the legal parameters of Na-
tive use of their own sovereign lands, triggers separation of powers
concerns, particularly under the Appointments Clause in Article II
of the United States Constitution.74  If a law contains a severability
clause, and a portion of that law is found by the courts to be uncon-
stitutional, the offending portions may be omitted, if possible, in
such a way that the remainder of the statute can be maintained,
rather than rendering the entire statute unconstitutional.75  The
IGRA contains such a severability clause, which may come into
play owing to the convolutions surrounding interpretation of its
language.76
72. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Gaming on Indian Reservations: Defining the
Trustee’s Duty in the Wake of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 122
(1997).
73. See Jason Kolkema, Comment, Federal Policy of Indian Gaming on Newly
Acquired Lands and the Threat to State Sovereignty: Retaining Gubernatorial
Authority over the Federal Approval of Gaming on Off-Reservation Sites, 73 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 361, 363 (1996).
74. The Appointments Clause provides in pertinent part
[the President] shall appoint Ambassadors, other public minis-
ters and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.  There is no authority for Congress to delegate power to a
state official (e.g., state governor), not properly “appointed” as a federal officer,
to veto favorable determinations made by an Executive Branch official legisla-
tively charged with making that determination (e.g., the Secretary of the Interior);
such actions would violate general separation-of-powers principles and the Ap-
pointments Clause.  See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v.
United States, 110 F.3d 688, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1997).
75. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
76. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994).
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In Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. United
States,77 the Ninth Circuit wrestled together a compromise, puta-
tively salvaging the constitutionality of the IGRA, while also al-
lowing the Oregon governor to have determinative say over Native
use of land (though the decision expressly claims that control is de-
termined by Congress).78  Meanwhile, the Secretary of the Interior
has published a ruling claiming that, should negotiations between
tribes and states fail, the Secretary has the power to approve a Na-
tive request to operate gambling facilities.79  The Secretary has
agreed not to implement the provisions of this ruling until a federal
court has addressed the issue of his authority to issue such provi-
sions.80
Clearly, an interpretation of the IGRA acceptable to all inter-
ests is lacking, and this “intrinsic controversy” written into the
IGRA might very well still be determined unconstitutional in its
application.  Should this be the case with the IGRA, restructuring
the law while omitting the offending text (as to who has “final
say”) would revert the resolution of “conflicts” between states and
Natives residing “within the states” back to the federal common
law precedent of Cabazon.81  Applying Cabazon, tribes would no
longer need to negotiate Class III gambling rights with state gover-
nors or resort to the assistance of the Department of the Interior.
Rather, tribes would be able to establish Class III gambling to the
extent that tribal laws prescribe in all situations in which the state
allowed any form of legal gambling.82
Note that if states take an antagonistic approach to the con-
cerns of tribes and are unwilling to negotiate Class III gambling
agreements, but rather hide behind the comfortable protections of
the Eleventh Amendment, the states are then faced with an unfor-
tunate possible countermeasure.  That is, the tribes may borrow the
states’ own strategy, a strategy of determined refusal to negotiate.
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided, in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma
v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,83 that tribes retained sovereign
immunity and were not subject to civil suit in state courts, even in
situations where the tribe had conducted business (or even tortious
77. 110 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1997).
78. See id. at 694-98.
79. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-11.
80. See id. at 6-12.
81. See Skibine, supra note 72, at 124-25.
82. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 210-14,
220-21 (1987).
83. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
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actions) outside of reservation lands.84  Thus, a tribe might be able
to establish a Class III gambling casino against the direct opposi-
tion of the state government, and yet the state would be left with-
out any means of legal recourse.85
This introduces the question as to whether members of Native
corporations are also covered by the protections of Kiowa in their
business dealings (though the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act would strongly suggest exclusion, they not being “tribe” mem-
bers), and it is difficult to predict how this already strained grasp
for definitional boundaries would and should be handled by the
courts.  Would a tribe from the Lower Forty-Eight be able to come
to Alaska and set up business, even gambling, unfettered by state
jurisdictional concerns?  These dances around the Eleventh
Amendment, and these convoluted explorations around the
boundaries of federal, state, and tribal sovereignty have posed dif-
ficult problems for the courts, and almost any result may seem to
reveal its own stripe of inequity.  One hopes that Congress, the
courts, the tribes, and the states will be able to work out some kind
of common ground in the near future that can serve to benefit both
the tribes and the states.
A discussion of the current legal state of affairs for Native
tribes of the other states is necessary to obtain a sense of what is
conventional practice and considered equitable in the contiguous
United States.  However, as indicated previously, these laws, rul-
ings, and attendant convolutions may not come to bear directly on
the actions of Alaska Native corporations, a result made even more
likely because of a recent Supreme Court case.  In Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Venetie II),86 a unanimous
Court held that the 1.8 million acres of land owned and occupied
by the Venetie Natives did not qualify as “Indian lands,” as they
were converted to alienable privately owned property (owned by
the Native corporation) under the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act, and thus were not to be characterized as lands under
tribal sovereignty.87  Rather, the lands are subject to the laws and
jurisdiction of the state of Alaska.88  The ruling nominally rein-
forces the notion that Alaska Natives are to be granted the same
rights and privileges as other American citizens, but the ruling also
leaves the Alaska Native corporations in an arguably worse posi-
tion than that of other tribes living under federally supervised “res-
84. See id. at 760.
85. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-10.
86. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
87. See id. at 523-24, 526-33.
88. See id.
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ervations” or “allotments” in that they are unable to establish sov-
ereign use of their own lands.  The Cabazon, Seminole, Kiowa, and
Venetie II Supreme Court decisions are all subject to sharp criti-
cism that they have led to inconsistent and unfair results, and all
cases seem to hinge to a great extent on brief passages of statutory
construction, without perhaps fully addressing the federal, state,
and tribal interests underlying the cases.  Owing to the controver-
sies stemming from these recent cases, it is highly likely that more
cases dealing with Native and state rights will soon find their way
to the Supreme Court.  Ideally, the Court and a watchful Congress
will work to assure that a coherent and equitable distribution of
rights is achieved.89
V.  STATE LOTTERIES
Perhaps no other form of gambling has affected the American
cultural consciousness as much as the recent proliferation of state
lotteries.  Lotteries have been around, and have been legal, since
the birth of our nation.90  Much of the public works of the Ameri-
can Colonies were funded with lotteries, and such institutions as
Harvard, Yale, Princeton, King’s College (Columbia), and others
received a portion of their initial capital through lotteries.91  Public
support of legal lotteries has ebbed and flowed over the two centu-
ries since that time, but the modern appreciation of state-
sponsored lotteries springs from the establishment of the New
Hampshire state lottery in 1964.92  New York followed suit in 1969,
New Jersey in 1970, and as the promotional efforts developed in
sophistication (as did the games themselves), the nationwide rush
to develop state lotteries caught on.93  Presently, thirty-seven states
and the District of Columbia run government-sponsored lotteries.94
89. The gambling business opportunities for Alaska Native corporations are
perhaps not as limited as this section portends.  Although unable to invest in gam-
bling operations within Alaska borders, at least some Native corporations have
capitalized on investments in gambling operations in other states that allow for a
greater range of gambling ventures.  See William J. Tobin, Voice of the Times: We
Don’t Want to Rush the Season, But . . ., ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000,
at J3 (commentary describing Sealaska Corp. investment in Native gambling op-
eration in Southern California, and Cook Inlet Region, Inc., investments in Ne-
vada resorts).
90. See Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Pol-
icy and the Law, 64 MISS. L.J. 291, 299 (1995).
91. See id. at 299-300.
92. See id. at 303.
93. See id.
94. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-1.
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The main argument in support of state lotteries is that they
produce large amounts of revenue, revenue that may reduce the
need to levy taxes.95  Lottery “taxation” also merits distinction as a
tax only paid by those who choose to pay it; it is a strictly voluntary
tax.96  In further support, proponents and promoters of state lot-
teries may specify that a portion of the lottery revenue is to be
earmarked for particular causes, such as improved education.97
Earmarking revenue for sympathetic causes has helped win consid-
erable popular support for state lotteries.98  Lotteries are thus gen-
erally accepted, if not enthusiastically encouraged, by the people of
most states, and lotteries perhaps pave the way to the acceptance
of other forms of legalized gambling within the various states.  For
example, as California featured a well-publicized state lottery long
before tribal casinos became an accepted and profitable industry,
one can perhaps infer that Californians, now accepting the tribal
casinos, would be willing to take the next step and legalize other
casinos.  In fact, pseudo-variants on casinos, card rooms, can be
found in both San Jose and Los Angeles, and California voters ap-
proved earlier this year the largest expansion yet in the types and
amount of Native gambling to be permitted in the state.99
But lotteries are not all fun and games benefiting their respec-
tive states without costs.  Lotteries are an especially heavily taxed
form of gambling to pursue, far and away the least remunerative to
players/taxpayers of any of the conventional forms of gambling.100
Whereas a craps player can expect to win back about 99% of eve-
rything wagered, and slot players will win back generally between
85%-97% of every dollar they gamble,101 lottery players face a mere
55% expected return on the money they wager.102  Even as far as
“sin taxes” go, the lottery players face an especially heavy one to
enjoy this particular brand of entertainment.
95. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 5, at 6.
96. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 48 (1992).
97. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 5, at 6.
98. See id.
99. See Mark Gladstone, Gambling Interests Have Strong Voices in State Poli-
tics, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 6, 2000 (noting that “California continues to
loosen its historic restrictions against betting”); see also Mark Henry, Indian-
Gaming Measure Wins Easily; Inland Tribal Leaders Among Those Celebrating
Prop. 1A Victory, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Mar. 8, 2000, at A14 (describing popular
support for expansion of gaming at Native casinos).
100. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-3.
101. See DWIGHT CREVET & LOUISE CREVET, SLOT MACHINE TRIVIA 5 (1989).
102. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 5, at 5.
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Another shortcoming of lotteries is that the depiction of lot-
tery money going to “good causes,” such as to further educational
funding, may be disingenuous on the part of lottery promoters.103
When lottery monies are used to fund specific, small-scale projects,
it is fairly easy to track and match the lottery revenue with the in-
tended distribution.104  If, for example, a lottery could be created to
fund widening portions of the Seward Highway, it would be fairly
easy to track the revenue “contributed,” and to track the funds as
they were applied to their purpose.  However, for larger scale and
ongoing efforts, in which the “earmarked” lottery money serves as
only a small portion of budget allocations, the earmarked money
may become lost in the budgetary shuffle.105  For example, if lottery
revenues are earmarked to provide for ten percent of a state’s edu-
cational budget, it becomes much easier for political considerations
and other expediencies to lead to lottery revenues being siphoned
off for other uses.106  In a perfect situation, where revenue ear-
marked for education actually contributes to education, it may still
simply substitute for other money originally budgeted for educa-
tional purposes, with this “original allocation” then used for alter-
nate purposes (perhaps to help pay for administrative and market-
ing efforts in promoting the state lottery).107  Seldom does the total
money actually allocated to education increase.108
The greatest disadvantage of legalizing state lotteries is the
cost borne by those who play them the most and contribute (i.e.,
lose) the most money: the poor.109  Whereas most forms of gam-
bling tend to see higher participation by individuals as their income
increases, research has shown that the greatest per capita participa-
tion in state lotteries is by minorities with little education and with
incomes below the poverty line.110  Thus, although other forms of
gambling may serve as income-neutral or even progressive taxes,
state lotteries act as a very severe regressive tax.  One could argue
that the actual individual players would not want the lotteries
structured otherwise; it is specifically the astronomical payoffs (un-
103. See id. at 6.
104. Dedicating lottery funds to such specialized, albeit worthy causes, will
nonetheless encounter problems of constitutionality.  As article IX, section 7 of
the Alaska Constitution reads, “[t]he proceeds of any state tax or license shall not
be dedicated to any special purpose.”
105. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 5, at 6.
106. See id.
107. See Rychlak, supra note 96, at 52.
108. See id.
109. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 5, at 13.
110. See id.
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fortunately, against astronomical odds) that attract the lottery
players, payoffs perhaps only available when “financed” by a low
expected return for any given player.  On an individual basis, the
choice to participate in lotteries might be fine, but the aggregation
of these individual choices to participate in lotteries seems a costly
societal undertaking to pursue great risks.  It is perhaps not sur-
prising that lottery promoters and administrators draw little atten-
tion to the poor odds and the regressive tax aspects of lotteries in
their marketing efforts.111  Looking at how the whole is supported
by its individual members, it is generally not a good policy for a
community to have its taxes paid by those who can bear its burden
least.112
Alaska simply would not stand to gain much by legalizing a
lottery, state-run or otherwise.  Alaska, perhaps singular among the
states in this regard, runs at a tax surplus.113  Many Alaska programs
are well-subsidized; the pressure to generate new sources of reve-
nue is possibly not as great in Alaska as it may be in other less for-
tunate states.114  Furthermore, many states have joined in the lot-
tery frenzy in a vicious race to the bottom, a race that Alaska can
probably avoid.115  Rather than passively allowing its citizens to
cross state lines to contribute money to lotteries in neighboring
states, many states have approved lotteries simply to make sure
that money earned by their own taxpayers remains within the state,
whether put to productive use or not.116  Alaska, nearer to Russia
and Canada than to the other American states, does not face this
problem of citizens readily spending money on the lotteries of rival
states.
Of course, adding tax dollars to an already existent tax surplus
may not be a bad thing.  With a state lottery, however, most of the
revenue generated comes from the state’s own population, and as
such, the money going to lotteries may be cheating other Alaska
goods and services on which the money would otherwise have been
111. See id. at 16-17.
112. These regressive tax criticisms may be applied to pull-tabs, bingo, and
some other forms of gambling as well, although research on the demographics of
who participates in these games and how much they participate is not extensive
enough to draw any conclusive parallels to lottery spending.
113. Cf. Tom Fink, Cap Would Force Government to Face Problems,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2000, at B4 (commentary putting the current
state surplus at over $30 billion dollars, and estimating state spending at over
$10,000 per capita annually).
114. See id.
115. See Rychlak, supra note 96, at 58.
116. See id.
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spent.117  The most successful gambling operations are those that at-
tract the expenditures of consumers residing outside the original
community.118  Most Las Vegas, Mississippi Gulf Coast, and Fox-
woods gambling revenue comes from out-of-state visitors, rather
than from home state residents.119  This strategy for success may
apply to lotteries as well.  The Louisiana State Lottery, commonly
known back then as “The Serpent,” was a highly successful late
1800’s enterprise that garnered ninety-three percent of its immense
profits from non-Louisiana residents.120  Venom spewed at the lot-
tery by politicians in other states, as a result of its nationwide suc-
cess (coupled with some inherent corruption in administration of
the lottery), inspired the strong legal and moral prohibitions
against most gambling in the late nineteenth century that continued
until legal gambling found a resurgence in mid-1960’s America.121
Unless administered on the Internet (which creates its own prob-
lems, not the least of which is that those most likely to play the lot-
tery are also among those least likely to have Internet access),122
there is simply little way for an Alaska lottery to attract out-of-
state dollars.  Beyond revenue generation, the most laudable goal
for the legalization of gambling would be the creation of new jobs.
State lotteries are not a particularly effective means of creating
new jobs.  Thus, although most Americans regard state lotteries as
neutral or even beneficial enterprises, there is not much economic
benefit in Alaska’s following the lead of its sister states by devel-
oping an Alaska lottery.
117. See generally Clotfelter et al., supra note 5, at 12 (noting that participation
rates for lottery state residents are double those for non-lottery state residents,
and per capita lottery spending in lottery states is triple that of non-lottery states;
these figures may be interpreted various ways, but suggest that most lottery
spending comes from in-state residents).
118. See William R. Eadington, Contributions of Casino-Style Gambling to Lo-
cal Economies, in GAMBLING, supra note 6, at 53, 61.
119. See id. at 60-61.
120. See Rychlak, supra note 96, at 40-44.
121. See id. at 42-44.
122. Note that even though lottery participation rates increase slightly with in-
crease in personal income (up to $100,000 annual income), per capita spending is
inversely correlated with wealth (i.e., people with lower incomes spend more on
lotteries).  Thus, Internet lotteries would face the compound problem of market-
ing to a smaller potential audience than would a conventional lottery as well as an
inability to target the demographic likely to spend the most on the product.  See
Clotfelter et al., supra note 5, at 13, tbl.11.
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VI.  CONVENIENCE GAMBLING
Convenience gambling comprises mostly slot machines and
video poker terminals found in establishments other than casinos,
that is, convenience stores, gas stations, bars, restaurants, and the
like.123  This type of gambling has been under recent consideration
in Alaska.124  It is a fairly common form of legal gambling, but is not
without controversy.  Until very recently, South Carolina had the
most extensive allotment of convenience gambling in the United
States, but in 1999, the state legislature voted for an outright ban.125
While not as readily characterized as a regressive tax as state lot-
teries, on the flip-side, convenience gambling does not generate the
substantial revenue that lotteries do.126  Furthermore, as people
only infrequently travel across state lines to play slot machines in
stores (even to closely neighboring states), convenience gambling
would rely upon and draw revenue from the local Alaska popula-
tion at least as much as a lottery would.127  Convenience gambling
also does not create new jobs in the way that destination gambling
123. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-4.
124. See Joling, supra note 12, at B3.  Note that Juneau and one of Alaska’s
southernmost towns, Ketchikan, have strong interests in both supporting and op-
posing the adoption of gambling.  These cities receive a heavy infusion of tourists
and tourist dollars each year, in that some 600,000 cruise ship passengers come
ashore in Juneau and Ketchikan annually.  Gambling may intuitively seem an at-
tractive enticement for the tourist crowd, but the reality of the situation under-
mines this presumption.  When outside of American waters (and, according to
critics, sometimes even while in Alaskan waters) these cruise ships feature lavish
on-board gambling opportunities that might forestall any interest (or available
funds) that tourists might have to gamble while ashore.
125. See Act of July 2, 1999, 1999 S.C. Acts 125 (comprehensive video gambling
act).  Much of the political opposition to legal convenience gambling was based on
moral grounds.  Note that the Act specified that a state-wide voter referendum
would determine the continued existence of legal video gaming terminals.  The
South Carolina Supreme Court deemed the referendum plan unconstitutional, but
owing to a severability clause in the Act, otherwise left the Act’s prospective ban
on convenience gambling in place.  Convenience gambling became illegal in South
Carolina on July 1, 2000.  See Joytime Distrib. and Amusement Co. v. State, 338
S.C. 634 (S.C. Oct. 14, 1999), reh’g denied, Oct. 20, 1999, cert. denied, 120 S. Ct
1719 (Apr. 24, 2000); see generally Chris Burritt, S.C. Pulling Plug on Video Poker;
Luck Runs Out Tonight at Midnight for Thousands of Players and the Businesses
that Raked in the Profits, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., June 30, 2000, at 6C (analyzing
impact on South Carolina jobs and revenue as result of ban).
126. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 5, at 2.
127. Cf. Adam Rose, The Regional Economic Impacts of Casino Gambling: As-
sessment of the Literature and Establishment of a Research Agenda 7 (Nov. 5,
1998), available at <http://www.ngisc.gov> (report to the National Gambling Im-
pact Study Commission).
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resorts may (via restaurants, lodging, shops, and other entertain-
ment above and beyond gambling).128
One criticism of all forms of gambling is based on the substitu-
tion effects theory.129  It provides that money that would otherwise
be spent on other aspects of the economy (e.g., food, shelter,
clothing) is redirected to gambling.130  That is, gambling spending
substitutes for other expenditures.  Revenue subject to substitution
effects can be described as a transfer of wealth rather than the
creation of wealth.131  This critique is especially cutting when ap-
plied to convenience gambling, as people going to the local market
may spend their money on a slot machine rather than the night’s
meal.  The paucity of scientific research on substitution effects and
patterns of how gambling consumers allocate their expenditures
requires application of the theory to be interpreted cautiously.
Nonetheless, when forms of gambling are saliently marketed and
made readily available in much the same manner as “impulse buys”
(e.g., candy and tabloids) at the same locations, one might readily
infer that convenience gambling merely redirects income that
would otherwise reach other goods and services.
Slot machines, video poker and other video gambling termi-
nals are considered the most efficient revenue-generating and per-
haps most addictive forms of gambling.132  Most casinos devote the
vast majority of their floor space to slot machines,133 and would
perhaps do away with much less profitable-per-square-foot table
games (such as craps, blackjack, and poker) altogether if it were
not for the fact that table games often draw a different group of
target consumers, and that forsaking table games might lead to loss
of market share to those neighboring casinos retaining table games.
Thus, the types of games which are used in convenience gambling
are perhaps the best option from the viewpoint of casino manage-
128. See discussion of destination gaming resorts infra Part IX; see also NGISC
FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-3 to 2-6; William R. Eadington, supra note 118,
at 59-62.
129. Substitution effects are also known as “cannibalization” effects.  See Rose,
supra note 127, at 5-8, 29.  See generally Ricardo Gazel, The Economic Impacts of
Casino Gambling at the State and Local Levels, in GAMBLING, supra note 6, at 74-
79.
130. See id.
131. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 425 (10th ed. 1976).  But see
Eugene Martin Christiansen, Gambling and the American Economy, in
GAMBLING, supra note 6, at 48-49.
132. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-5.
133. See John Hoffman et al., Analysis of the Casino Survey: Report to the Na-
tional Gambling Impact Study Commission tbl.3 (Apr. 14, 1999), available at
<http://www.ngisc.gov>.  Cf. VINSON, supra note 1, at 73.
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ment,134 but there is little reason why the government would focus
on the factors of maximizing the addictive nature of state-
sponsored gambling enterprises and maximizing profits-per-square-
foot dedicated to gambling use, particularly when these factors will
operate primarily on a local consumer base.  Developing conven-
ience gambling in Alaska is probably not advisable at this time,
particularly in parts of the state drawing few out-of-state visitors to
help offset convenience gambling’s cannibalistic impact on
Alaska’s own citizens.
VII.  SPORTS BETTING
Gambling on the outcomes of athletic events is the greatest
source of illegal  gambling revenue in America.135  It is also the only
form of legal gambling that sports a sizable contingent of profes-
sionals making comfortable livings purely off of choosing winners
correctly more often than not (i.e., while not participating or influ-
encing the outcomes directly).  That said, this form of gambling is
currently truly legal in but one state: Nevada.  (Oregon, being
quirkily Oregon, has a lottery based in part on the outcome of pro-
fessional football games, but this is not sports betting in a conven-
tional sense.136)  Atlantic City, New Jersey, features many profes-
sional boxing matches and was given the choice as to whether to
allow legal sports betting on athletic events in 1976, when legal
gambling in Atlantic City was first established, but officials re-
frained from exercising this option at the behest of professional
sports leagues that wished to put a cap on the spread of legal sports
betting (and perhaps minimize its impact on the athletes).137  The
NGISC Final Report severely criticizes aspects of sports betting
(even more than Internet gambling), specifically recommending
“that betting on collegiate and amateur athletic events that is cur-
rently legal be banned altogether.”138
Alaska could make betting on the outcomes of sporting events
legal, and would stand to gain a considerable sum in revenue by
allocating a portion of the handle to the state, but sports betting, of
134. Cf. JOHN GOLLEHON, LAS VEGAS TRIVIA 168 (2000).
135. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-14.
136. See id.
137. See James H. Frey, Gambling on Sport: Policy Issues, 8 J. GAMBLING
STUD. 351, 360 (1992).
138. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-18.  Curiously, it is college
football where “professional” gamblers profit the most, it being the one sport
where Vegas sportsbooks lose money.  The sportsbooks consistently make the
money back, and then some, the following day on professional football games.  See
VINSON, supra note 1, at 89.
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the many forms of gambling available, encounters perhaps the
strongest resistance against legalization.  Although gambling may
be looked upon as a reasonably harmless means of entertainment
for many adults, it is highly inadvisable that such behavior be
stimulated in underage children and young adults, a likely indirect
effect of legalizing sports betting.139  Many youths are intense sports
fans, so a baseline of knowledge and interest in the activity is al-
ready present (whereas many forms of gambling, such as playing
blackjack or betting on the horses, require a level of familiarity that
are usually first acquired through the adult gambling experience it-
self).  Unlike many forms of gambling that require specialized
equipment, betting on sporting events is remarkably easy for un-
derage youths to mimic and to actively participate in with little ef-
fort.  Legalizing sports betting strongly impacts awareness of the
practice in young minds, while implicitly condoning the activity as
these youths grow older.  Legalized sports betting also distorts the
popular image of professional and amateur sports, which have ex-
pended great efforts to maintain an image of athletics as being dis-
tinct, more prestigious, and perhaps more legitimate than other
related forms of entertainment, such as professional wrestling.140
The professional and collegiate sports leagues have suffered
through enough gambling scandals to have learned to invest great
effort in restricting the amount of wagering over sports events.141
Legal sports betting is exclusive to Nevada; it is not even available
at the various tribal casinos nationwide, even though these tribal
casinos often face less of the legal and political pressures that casi-
nos under “other jurisdictions” would encounter should they per-
mit sports betting.  This pressure is probably due, in no small part,
to the lobbying efforts of the professional and collegiate sports
leagues in most states.  Alaska has no major professional sports
teams, and relatively little in the way of collegiate athletics, thus
weakening the possibility of arguments and threats by the lobbies
of various sports leagues against legalizing sports betting in the
139. Cf. id. at 2-14 to 2-15.
140. See, e.g., Elizabeth Wasserman, Analysis: Should the U.S. Regulate or Ban
Online Gambling? (Aug. 14, 2000) <http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/
08/14/ gamble.or.not.idg/index.html>.
141. See Cedric W. Dempsey, NCAA Weighs in on Internet Gambling Bill,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000, at A22 (commentary by NCAA President warning
of “threat Internet gambling poses to the integrity of our games and to the welfare
of the athletes”); see also, e.g., Lew Freedman, NCAA: It’s a Losing Battle,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 1, 2000, at 3A (sportswriter opinion column cit-
ing recent point-shaving scandals in basketball programs at Northwestern, Boston
College, and Arizona State University).
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state.  Nonetheless, as legal sports betting reaps less revenue than
other forms of gambling,142 and faces a stiff resistance from legaliza-
tion opponents, legal sports betting is perhaps a less than prime
candidate for consideration in the state of Alaska.
VIII.  PARI-MUTUEL GAMBLING
Pari-mutuel gambling includes wagering on such live events as
horse racing, dog racing, and jai alai.143  Quasi-gambling activities
along the lines of fishing derbies and dogsled races are common
enough in Alaska, and are tightly regulated by state law, but the
conventional pari-mutuel activities are mostly infeasible under-
takings in Alaska, including jai alai.  Even in climates optimally
conducive to breeding and sporting thoroughbreds and grey-
hounds, horse racing and dog racing have become difficult and
costly endeavors in the United States.  While interest in legalized
gambling has risen and profits boomed for most forms of gam-
bling—from lotteries to traditional casino games—profits and mar-
ket share for pari-mutuel events have steadily declined over the
past several years.144  Jai alai, the one common pari-mutuel event
that could plausibly be staged in Alaska as well as anywhere, has
perhaps weathered the changes in the gambling marketplace worst.
Although previously featured in Las Vegas, jai alai is currently
limited to Florida (the predominant market, yet with only six ven-
ues), Rhode Island, and Connecticut; the continued commercial vi-
ability of this form of entertainment is doubtful.145
Pari-mutuel activities may provide benefits in the way of jobs,
particularly for some highly-specialized skilled laborers, but simul-
taneously (and stemming partially from labor expenses), these ac-
tivities are costly to operate.146  Furthermore, pari-mutuel events
lack the characteristics that appeal most to the contemporary gam-
142. Private sportsbooks bring in a constant “vig” (percentage of the money
wagered) of about 5%, with only a fraction going to the state in taxes, while state-
sponsored lotteries can bring in 40% or more of the money wagered as state reve-
nue.  See VINSON, supra note 1, at 88.
143. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-11.  Jai alai, for those not
acquainted with the pastime, is a Spanish Basque-originated sport somewhat akin
to racquetball, but involves a scoop-like basket attached to the wrist instead of a
racquet, and uses an extremely hard pelota (very similar in appearance to a bil-
liard cue ball) instead of a springy rubber ball.  The pelota often travels at speeds
well in excess of 100 m.p.h., and this contributes to jai alai’s reputation as a fast-
paced and quite dangerous sport.
144. See Christiansen, supra note 131, at 39.
145. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-12.
146. See id. at 2-12.
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bling consumer, and suffer in popularity as a result.  As manifested
by trends in gambling profit reports, today’s gamblers seem to fa-
vor events which feature control by the user (or at least the illusion
thereof), little cognitive effort, and rapid resolution of betting out-
comes.  The illusion of control of a horse’s performance may not be
as clearly evident as choosing whether to hit or stay on a blackjack
hand.  Seeking a betting advantage by developing familiarity with
the respective abilities of various horses, dogs, and jai alai players
requires time and intellectual investment that many gamblers may
be unwilling to expend.  Finally, pari-mutuel event outcomes are
resolved slowly.  While with off-site betting, an avid gambler can
spread bets around numerous racetracks, any one track will be
lucky to stage a dozen races over the course of a day, and even the
most avid gambler will have difficulty executing more than a score
of bets per day.  Meanwhile, most table games feature twenty or
more gambling outcomes per hour, and slot machines and video
gaming terminals allow gamblers to control the rate of gambling
outcomes (which is often quite high, more than one per minute).  It
may be safe to bet that popular support and profit potential of pari-
mutuel gambling is not sufficient to render legalization in the state
of Alaska economically or politically advisable, even under the
most pro-gambling zeitgeist.
IX.  DESTINATION GAMING RESORTS
The term “destination gaming resorts” refers not to a form of
gambling per se, but rather to a specific type of gambling facility
and the accompanying gambling “experience.”147  Destination
gaming resorts are hotels and casinos that attract tourists who
come and stay at the resorts (in addition to day visitors) with the
intent of gambling and being otherwise entertained (and spending
money) at the resort.  The hotels and casinos on the Las Vegas
Strip are the archetypal examples of destination gaming resorts;
such resorts tend to be highly concentrated in specific cities, such as
Atlantic City, Reno, and Ledyard, Connecticut (Foxwoods and the
nearby Mohegan Sun resorts).  These resorts generally feature all
of the accoutrements and lavishness that one would expect at other
tourist destinations, plus gambling.  Needless to say, these opera-
tions are extremely capital-intensive.  Mirage Resorts (prior to its
recent acquisition by MGM for $6.7 billion) spent $1.6 billion to
construct the Bellagio resort in Las Vegas, which opened in Octo-
ber of 1998.148  These operations can also be immensely profitable.
147. See id. at Executive Summary 25.
148. See, e.g., Dave Berns, Bellagio Announces End of Public Gallery Viewings,
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As one example, following the merger, MGM Mirage Resorts
posted third-quarter 2000 profits of $73.2 million (up 73% from
third-quarter 1999).149
Destination gaming resorts have the specific goal of drawing reve-
nue from out-of-state tourists rather than focusing efforts on de-
riving income from the local population.  These resorts also have
proved a valuable source of jobs for the local population, particu-
larly in such previously troubled areas as the Gulf Coast in Missis-
sippi and Atlantic City.  Arguments that gambling is a sterile indus-
try, merely reallocating wealth rather than creating economic
growth, lose their force when faced with the phoenix-like successes
of such destination gaming resort cities as Las Vegas, Atlantic City,
and Biloxi, Mississippi.  Las Vegas has risen from an outpost in the
desert between Los Angeles and Salt Lake City on I-15, to become
far and away the fastest growing city in America.150  No longer is
the city exclusively a “gambling town.”  Other industries (e.g., con-
struction, housing, retail goods and services)151 have sprung up to
support the growing population and have turned it into a metro-
politan area largely indistinguishable—with the exception of two
especially lively and garish streets lined with casinos—from any
other vibrant large city in the United States.  Although the suc-
cesses of other gaming cities, such as Atlantic City, have not been
quite as impressive as that of Las Vegas, the gambling industry in
Atlantic City has turned what used to be a former vacation spot
relic of the 1920’s into a viable, thriving city once again.152
Only one Alaska city has the resources, including an interna-
tional airport, to develop as a destination gaming resort locale: An-
chorage.  Perhaps Anchorage does not present itself as a leading
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 24, 2000, at 1D.
149. See Dave Berns, MGM Mirage Profits Soar, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 20,
2000, at 3D.  In addition to the opulent Bellagio resort and others, MGM Mirage
Resorts lays claim to the largest hotel in the world, the MGM Grand in Las Vegas,
at 5,005 rooms.  Nine of the ten largest hotels in the world are in Las Vegas.
150. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-1.
151. See, e.g., Genaro C. Armas, Big Apple, Vegas Top Census Metro
Population Charts (Oct. 20, 2000) <http://foxnews.com/national/102000/
census_metrogrowth.sml> (reporting construction industry response to 62%
growth in Las Vegas population between Apr. 1990 and July 1999).
152. For those skeptical of the truth of the assertion that Atlantic City (self-
proclaimed as “America’s Favorite Playground”) is a thriving jewel on the New
Jersey shore, a visit to compare Atlantic City with other portions of the Jersey
Coast can serve as a reminder of how positive the impact of the gambling industry
can be.  Granted, much of this success may be attributed to exorbitant government
allocations provided to Atlantic City.  Nonetheless, the point that gambling has
bolstered the economy of host cities remains a valid, albeit contentious, one.
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candidate to become the next gambling resort town along the lines
of Las Vegas and Atlantic City, and as far as American tourists and
American tourist dollars are concerned, Anchorage is probably not
suited for such a role.153  Alaska is not easily accessible and the
American gambling market is already too close to saturation to en-
able Anchorage to flourish as a gambling destination based strictly
on projected American tourism.  But the globally-minded will re-
alize that there is another source of pro-gambling tourists to target:
Asia.
With the exception of eight casinos in Macau, gambling is es-
sentially prohibited in the Asian nations of China, India, and Ja-
pan154 (the first, second, and seventh most populous markets in the
world.155)  In some ways, this is rather curious, as the notions of
luck, fortune, and “gambling” hold a prominent place in Japanese
and Chinese cultures.156  The fortunes of the casinos in Las Vegas
are impacted to a remarkable extent by the winning and losing
streaks of high-rolling Asian businessmen.157  Casinos in Britain de-
rive considerable revenue from Chinese visitors.158  A visit to a card
room in San Jose, California, will serve as a boisterous introduction
to gambling’s popularity and how passionate large contingents of
Chinese and Chinese-Americans are about gambling.  There is
even a large gambling room, the Dragon Room, adjacent to the
main casino floor in the Taj Mahal, Atlantic City’s largest casino,
specifically designed to cater to Chinese and Chinese-American
tourists.  There are few places in the world farther away from
China than New Jersey; the fact that Chinese gamblers provide a
large enough consumer demand to encourage supply as far away as
New Jersey provides salient evidence as to how lucrative targeting
these particular consumer markets may be.
153. Although miniscule in comparison to Anchorage, the stunning natural
beauty of the surroundings and the idiosyncratic balance between outdoor activi-
ties and gambling attractions in Lake Tahoe, Nevada, may serve to make it a suit-
able model of a “gambling destination” for Anchorage to draw upon for inspira-
tion.
154. See William N. Thompson, Casinos de Juegos del Mundo: A Survey of
World Gambling, in GAMBLING, supra note 6, at 20-21.
155. See U.N. Revision of the World Population Estimates and Projections (vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2000) <http://www.popin.org/pop1998/>.
156. Cf. Thompson, supra note 154, at 20.
157. See, e.g., K.J. Evans, Culture Talk, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 21, 1998, at
1D (noting that 17% of Las Vegas table game revenue, and 80% of revenue from
traditionally “high-stakes” games, such as baccarat, comes from Asian high-
rollers, known as “whales” in casino parlance).
158. See Thompson, supra note 154, at 20.
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The vast majority of Asian tourists travelling to the United
States with the intent to gamble visit Las Vegas.  Anchorage is also
a destination for Asian tourists, and a natural advantage that An-
chorage possesses over Las Vegas is that a flight from Tokyo to
Anchorage takes at minimum four hours less travel time (each
way) than a flight from Tokyo to Las Vegas.159  Advantages in flight
times to Anchorage compared to Las Vegas may not be as pro-
nounced for flights originating in Hong Kong or other Asian cities,
but a general rule of thumb is that flights from Asian cities in the
Northern Hemisphere will take less time to Anchorage than they
will to Las Vegas—or any other American destination gaming re-
sort city.  (Hawai’i features similar travel time advantages, but Ha-
wai’i currently does not allow any form of legal gambling, and the
current structure of the highly sophisticated and mature Hawai’ian
tourist industry makes it likely to be much more resistant to the in-
troduction of gambling than the industry in Alaska.)160  Total time
of travel plays a key role in the way many tourists plan their vaca-
tions, and Anchorage can exploit its natural advantage on this di-
mension to the benefit of Alaska labor, the Alaska economy, and
even for the sake of convenience for the Asian gambling consumer
market.  Alaskans with an aggressive entrepreneurial spirit may do
well to carefully scrutinize the potential for profit in developing the
Anchorage tourist gaming trade and to investigate the possibility of
adapting state law to implement and regulate its growth.
X.  SOCIETAL IMPACT OF GAMBLING
Critics of legalized gambling are quick to point out its costs to
society, and this is a legitimate concern worthy of examination.
The main fears about the introduction of gambling into a region fo-
cus on the potential increase in crime and potential increase in the
159. The distance one-way from Tokyo to Anchorage is 3487 miles (5612 km);
one-way from Tokyo to Las Vegas is 5537 miles (8910 km).  The “four” hour sav-
ings is an estimate based on assumptions of constant wind velocity, wind direction,
and non-stop flights.  Actual travel times will vary (especially until Tokyo to An-
chorage becomes a common non-stop route).
160. Cf. Rose, supra note 127, at 3 (commenting on the underwhelming success
of gambling ventures in New Orleans).  New Orleans, like Hawai’i, is a long-time
popular tourist destination for many reasons other than gambling, and this may
severely hamper gambling enterprise efforts to capture tourist dollars.  By infer-
ence, Hawai’i gambling would face a similar fate.  Furthermore, established hotels
and lodgings in Hawai’i (and New Orleans) are likely to resist an influx of com-
peting Vegas-style hotel/casinos to a degree unlike that as would be encountered
in Alaska.
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incidence and effects of compulsive gambling.161  Before engaging
in a detailed discussion of these issues, it is perhaps best to preface
with the warning that research into the costs of gambling on society
is woefully scant and incomplete.162  Much of the relevant research
suffers from bias or unscientific methods, and the statistical data
(which conventionally serves as the foundation upon which “per-
suasive” arguments are built) is inconclusive.
It would be disingenuous to say that the introduction of gam-
bling into areas does not increase the crime rate; the development
of successful gambling enterprises certainly does have an impact on
crime.  The question, then, is how great is this impact?  An exami-
nation of pertinent data lends itself to a conclusion that the change
is noticeable, but not particularly large.163  Whether the benefits of
the gambling revenue outweigh the attendant costs in crime is a
subjective decision.  One issue to keep in the foreground during
this discussion is the issue of causality.  Are increases in crime due
to gambling per se, or are increases in crime due to increases in
tourist volume?164  Tourists, unfortunately, present an attractive
target for crime, and regions that attract more tourists also demon-
strate an increase in crime, whether that increase is due to the
opening of casinos, theme parks, or shopping malls.165  Cities in Ne-
vada, such as Las Vegas and Reno, do not face crime rates ex-
ceeding other cities of similar size (in fact, the crime rate in Las
Vegas is relatively low).166  The evidence simply does not indicate
161. See Gazel, supra note 129, at 67, 73.
162. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-1.
163. See William J. Miller & Martin D. Schwartz, Casino Gambling and Street
Crime, in GAMBLING, supra note 6, at 126-31.
164. See id. at 129.
165. See id. at 126-31.
166. This point is not without controversy.  Las Vegas, although the archetypal
gambling town, is perhaps not a good indicator of the relation between gambling
and crime rates.  Different reports may indicate nearly polar opposite results, and
the juxtaposition of a burgeoning retirement-age population in America’s reput-
edly fabled “Sin City” and fastest growing city perhaps adds a curious volatility to
a dimension of urban life generally considered fairly stable.  That said, current re-
ports indicate that Las Vegas crime rates do not seem out of line for a metropolis
of its size.  See, e.g., Best Places to Retire (last visited Oct. 31, 2000)
<http://www.money.com/money/depts/tools/bpretire_citypages/lasvega_nv.html>
(indicating violent crime rates slightly higher, and property crime rates lower than
the national average); see generally, Marion Greene & Michael P. Krein, Crime in
Las Vegas: Stats on Las Vegas Crime Inaccurate (last modified Jan. 28, 2000)
<http://www.las-vegas-real-estate.com/crime.htm> (interesting, if perhaps biased,
account of factors creating difficulty in fixing an accurate crime rate “value” in a
rapidly expanding high-profile tourist destination like Las Vegas).
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that the existence of gambling itself causes a change in crime rates,
beyond the effects of population changes and tourist activity.167
As with any reinforcing behavior, there are people who gam-
ble to excess.  Providing a legal gambling environment may exacer-
bate the problem of compulsive gambling, and is a cost to consider
in the expansion of legalized gambling.  As with most aspects of
gambling behavior and its effects, there is a lack of good research
into how threatening the compulsive gambling problem is, but most
reports indicate that 1.5%-7.3% of Americans will face problems
with compulsive gambling during their lifetimes.168  Research into
compulsive gambling in Las Vegas suggests a rate of 6.6%.169  This
number is probably something close to a maximal value for com-
pulsive gambling incidence in America, as the Las Vegas popula-
tion is, to some extent, self-selecting for gamblers and compulsive
gamblers as a place to live.  For sake of reference, as to the inci-
dence of a costly social problem, the rate of alcohol abuse in the
American population is slightly over 7%.170
One may assert that compulsive gambling is limited to the
gamblers, but one must also consider the impact on others depend-
ent in some way on the compulsive gambler (e.g., family and co-
workers).171  These indirect effects of compulsive gambling are ex-
tremely difficult to quantify and are beyond the reach of current
studies.  Each state must determine whether the benefits of gam-
bling as a form of revenue, jobs, and entertainment (for the more
than 90% of the population that does not compulsively gamble)
outweigh the direct and indirect costs of the problem.
While legal gambling is a large force in today’s economy, it
pales in comparison to the volume of illegal gambling that takes
place.172 Any assessment of the compulsive gambling problem has
to include the incidence of illegal gambling in the equation to ob-
tain a real sense of a baseline level of compulsive gambling.  Only
then may one properly draw inferences as to the impact of legaliza-
167. See Miller & Schwartz, supra note 163, at 126-31.
168. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4-5.
169. The true incidence of problem gambling in Las Vegas may be somewhat
higher, as this figure comes from a study based on voluntary self-reports (i.e., per-
sons willing to admit to a gambling problem).  See David Strow, Study Pinpoints
Prevalence of Problem Gambling (May 24, 1999) <http://www.lasvegassun.com/
sunbin/stories/text/1999/may/24/508837298/htm>.
170. This figure may also understate this problem, as it only reports incidence
of alcoholism in those over 18 years of age.  See Alcoholism and Alcohol-Related
Problems: A Sobering Look (last visited Oct. 30, 2000) <http://www.ncadd.org/
problems.html>.
171. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4,  at 4-13.
172. See id. at 2-14.
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tion.  If rates of compulsive gambling in a community do not in-
crease with the introduction of legal gambling—that is, do not in-
crease the rates already present and presumed attributable to ille-
gal gambling—it is presumptive to conclude that the “legality” of
gambling is a relevant dimension to the incidence of compulsive
gambling.
Anti-gambling critics may attempt to link compulsive gam-
bling to crime and substance abuse.  Correlational studies may de-
pict a positive correlation between the existence of compulsive
gamblers and crimes committed by them (i.e., increases in the like-
lihood that a person has a gambling problem, or increases in the
severity of the problem, relates positively to increases in the likeli-
hood that the same person has been involved in crime, most com-
monly larceny).173  Similar studies may likewise demonstrate a posi-
tive link between compulsive gambling and substance abuse.174
These studies provide an emotional thrust to the arguments against
legalization of gambling, but these correlational studies contain the
same weakness present in all correlational studies.  It is impossible
to say, based on correlational evidence alone, whether the gam-
bling caused either the problem with crime or substance abuse.175
In fact, the cause-effect relationship may just as likely go the other
way.176  That is, the more likely people are to commit crimes, the
more likely these same people, with exposure to gambling, are to
become compulsive gamblers.  It is rather likely that a certain
thrill-seeking or risk-seeking set of personality traits confounds the
causality issue in a manner rendering it difficult to disentangle
which behavior is “causing” which other behaviors.  That said, the
argument that gambling causes crime demands a leap in logic that
current research is unable to support.
One consideration that discussion of the legalization of gam-
bling tends to downplay is the impact on children.  Children may
not legally gamble, so most gambling marketing and literature
completely ignores their existence and the impact that gambling
may have upon them.  Most state lotteries are heavily advertised,
and intuitively, children view more advertising, and are less
numbed and resistant to its enticements, than the target adult
population.  Research suggests that today’s children, raised in an
environment of incessant gambling promotions, may be more sus-
ceptible than their parents to the development of gambling prob-
173. See Henry R. Lesieur, Costs and Treatment of Pathological Gambling, in
GAMBLING, supra note 6, at 157.
174. See id. at 158.
175. See, e.g., DAVID G. MYERS, EXPLORING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4-7 (1994).
176. See id.
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lems at some point during their lifetimes.177  A significant percent-
age of underage children in gambling communities reports having
gambled.178  As children have less experience with handling money
and dealing with probabilistic outcomes and expectations, and gen-
erally have much less money to dispose of freely, it is quite reason-
able to expect that the “gambling bug” may be more virulent in its
attacks upon children, particularly teenagers, than it is on mature
adults.  Possible drastic steps that can be taken to reduce this pres-
ent and future problem include bans on gambling and/or bans on
gambling advertising to decrease the exposure and awareness of
children to gambling.
In contrast to these blunt prohibitory measures, perhaps the
best way to ameliorate the problem is through responsible educa-
tion.  Promoters of lotteries and other forms of gambling do little
to educate the public to fully appreciate the risks involved in gam-
bling, how to gamble “responsibly,” and how to recognize and re-
spond to the symptoms of problem gambling.  State regulations can
amend this problem through better educational efforts.  This edu-
cation can apply equally to children.  Although many may fear that
teaching children about gambling somehow condones the behavior,
the alternative options are blind ignorance or having attitudes to-
ward gambling taught exclusively by gambling promotional adver-
tisements.  Gambling is a relatively innocuous form of entertain-
ment for many Americans; there is little to be gained by not
educating the public to a fuller awareness as to the ramifications of
their pursuits and the choices they make, even at a young age.
This Note has discussed at some length the concern of the sub-
stitution effects of gambling in local economies.  The multiplicative,
or indirect, effects of gambling should be more fully covered as
well.179  A new industry can have multiplicative effects, in that
money, coming into the local community on account of the new in-
dustry, may lead to complementary expenditures in other aspects
of the local market.  Families who travel to Las Vegas “to gamble”
may spend additional money at theme park attractions, shopping
malls, restaurants, theatres, and other goods and services while
there.  These additional expenditures can be characterized as mul-
tiplicative effects of legalized gambling in Las Vegas.  Findings of
strong multiplicative effects indicate that the introduction of a par-
ticular condition in the community “trickles across” to benefit
177. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-20.
178. See id. at 7-23.
179. The term “multiplicative effects” is synonymous with the “multiplier ef-
fects” usage more commonly found in economics literature.  See, e.g., Rose, supra
note 127, at 5; Gazel,  supra note 129, at 69-71.
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other sectors of the community as well.  Predicting the multiplica-
tive effects of introducing gambling into new markets is a difficult
undertaking, and current research is not at the level where one can
apply models easily to determine with precision how different
forms of gambling may impact the Alaska economy.180  Neverthe-
less, experience indicates that the multiplicative effects of gambling
do exist, and are a highly relevant factor to keep in mind as Alaska
seeks out its role in the nationwide spread and acceptance of legal-
ized gambling in the years ahead.181
XI.  CONCLUSION
The type of gambling to legalize, if any, is a policy issue that
each state is responsible for selecting and enforcing for its own ju-
risdiction.  Most states feature state lotteries.  Many states feature
casino games, especially on Native lands.  Several states allow con-
venience gambling, and a select few even allow destination gaming
resorts.  Participating states derive revenue and benefit from job
creation through these gambling enterprises.  Alaska currently al-
lows none of these types of gambling.  Rather, Alaska allows pull-
tabs and charity bingo.  This is perhaps not the optimal mix for
Alaska, but the more complex challenge is to predict how the vari-
ous forms of gambling would affect Alaska.
By examining popular forms of legal gambling in America, this
Note has covered how these forms of gambling might be addressed
in Alaska.  Many unique aspects of Alaska shape how legalized
gambling might impact the state, including: Alaska’s enviable
sources of tax revenue, the physical nature of the land and the
widely-dispersed quality of its small population, the state-chartered
corporate status of the Native population, and the lack of nearby
rival gambling states to necessitate rapid “race to the bottom” ma-
neuverings to exploit legal gambling opportunities.  Because of
these and other factors, the introduction of most new forms of le-
galized gambling in Alaska, including the creation of an Alaska
state lottery, is not advised at this time. Furthermore, the forms of
gambling currently allowed in Alaska provide little in the way of
jobs or revenue, but do introduce the risks of crime as well as other
socioeconomic costs; Alaska is perhaps best off curtailing these
forms of gambling as well.182
180. See generally Rose, supra note 127, at 9-13, 19.
181. See id. at 19.
182. Admittedly, these games do provide salient benefits for pull-tab parlor
proprietors and a few other lucky Alaskans, and perhaps cause little general harm
to others.  The argument of “no harm, no foul” is perhaps an acceptable defense
against the mild condemnations of this Note directed toward eradication of pull-
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It would be advisable to legalize only one type of gambling in
Alaska, and to limit its legalization within the confines of one
city.183  That city, Anchorage, is a uniquely attractive place to de-
velop destination gaming resorts; however, the American gambling
consumer market appears too near saturation for Anchorage
gaming to target American gamblers exclusively.  Rather, Anchor-
age should take advantage of the shorter flight times from Asia,
compared to other American resort towns, and strive to cater to a
high-rolling Asian clientele.  With the exception of eight casinos in
Macau, gambling is illegal in China, India, and Japan.  As such,
Anchorage’s relative proximity to Asia makes Anchorage perfectly
situated to capture the lion’s share of the lucrative Asian consumer
market.  Efforts might be made to investigate the feasibility of ex-
panding legalized gambling in Anchorage to a limited degree and
developing Anchorage into a destination gaming resort city.184
A. Gregory Gibbs
tabs and bingo, but lacks persuasive force to justify the expansion of these enter-
prises in Alaska.
183. Eagle River, though small and currently lacking sufficient resources for
the development of destination gaming resorts, is close to the international airport
and connected to Anchorage by a wide, well-maintained highway, and perhaps
would not make for an unreasonable addition to this singular list.  Girdwood, as it
already exists as a destination resort town, would make an intuitive and beautiful
additional choice, but the dangerousness, low volume capacity, and sometimes
impassable conditions of the Seward Highway argue against the notion of Gird-
wood serving as an attractive site for destination gaming resorts.  Casinos, and the
gambling culture, are not sufficiently resilient to survive the on-again, off-again
business vagaries that are a part of life for ski resorts and winter sports enthusi-
asts.
184. Crazy?  Hardly.  Bugsy Siegel was crazy.
